6 de agosto 2024
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One week after the elections in Venezuela, the country is still torn between the expectation of a democratic change and the threat of an escalation of authoritarianism, violence and uncertainty. Each day that passes there is an increase in the evidence and denunciations of the electoral fraud perpetrated by President and incumbent candidate Nicolás Maduro with the collusion of the National Electoral Council (NEC).
On Friday, August 2, a new report from the NEC stated that based on 97% of the tally sheets, it proclaimed Nicolas Maduro the winner with 51.95% of the votes against 43.18% for Edmundo Gonzalez, but it didn't present the results of the precinct-by-precinct voting.
At the same time, the opposition presented more than 83% of the precinct tally sheets, resulting in 67% of valid votes going to Edmundo Gonzalez, against 30% for Nicolas Maduro.
The opposition's results have already been recognized by the governments of the United States, Argentina, Peru, Costa Rica and others, while Brazil, Mexico and Colombia have proposed that they facilitate a dialogue, and have asked Maduro to publish the data broken down by polling station and for an impartial verification of the results.
In the program Esta Semana we spoke with political scientist Daniel Zovatto, Global Fellow at the Wilson Center, about the possible scenarios for a way out of this crisis, about which Zovatto says: "The regime knows it has lost the election, it knows it has little legitimacy, it knows it has little popular support, and therefore, the less legitimacy it has, the more repression it has to impose, or at least threaten repression."
"Between the pressure from the United States, and at the same time [the offer of] facilitation by Brazil and Colombia to help find a way out, we have to see if it's possible to persuade the Maduro regime to enter into a negotiation process to find a solution among Venezuelans with the support of the international community," says Zovatto, warning that pragmatism is required, and that there will be "guarantees given that many will not like, and it will be a tough pill to swallow."
According to Zovatto, this is not an election in a democratic system "where you go to the polls and there is a result 24 or 48 hours later. It is the transition of an authoritarian regime that seeks a negotiated electoral solution."
If these negotiations fail, Zovatto does not rule out the possibility that "Maduro's regime will step on the gas and move toward a scenario similar to that of Nicaragua [in 2021]. At the moment, that is the most likely scenario." However, the analyst insists that this is not happening yet. "The regime is making many threats, but it is not yet hitting hard. I'm not saying it won't do so, but for the moment there is still the possibility that, between pressure and negotiation, one or more solutions can eventually be found."
Is it possible at the moment to confirm who is the president-elect of Venezuela?
Daniel Zovatto: We have one election, with two results and two apparent winners. It is unprecedented and absurd. But the most serious issue is that the National Electoral Council, which is the institutional body that should publish on its website the breakdown of the Electoral College tallies by polling station –this is a common practice by Latin America's and the world's electoral bodies– is not doing so. Meanwhile, the opposition of Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia and Maria Corina Machado, which is not the institutional body, has managed to produce a website and upload 83% of the polling station tally sheets.
In light of everything we are seeing, it is clear that who won the election is Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia, because if Chavismo [Maduro] had won it, they would be showing the tally sheets. Maduro is aware of this limitation and is trying to take the focus of attention away from the National Electoral Council, by taking his case to the Electoral Chamber of the Superior Court of Justice, which is not the competent body, and which is co-opted by [Maduro's] government.
Neither the National Electoral Council, nor the Electoral Chamber of the Judiciary are impartial, but they're trying to make a move to take the spotlight off the Council by taking it to the Court, saying: "Electoral Chamber, you investigate. Do everything you have to do to verify and then make a judicial decision."
From my point of view, this move is worthless. It will not legitimize Maduro, and as the Carter Center has rightly said in its report, this is an undemocratic election that has not met the minimum standards of integrity in any of its stages, including the official count, the transmission of results, the verification of vote tallies. The electoral part will continue to be disputed, but even though it's not yet recognized as such, we have already entered the negotiation stage, in the sense that everyone is looking for a way to find a negotiated solution to this serious crisis.
Two diplomatic initiatives in Venezuela
We saw an attempt by the Organization of American States to agree on a resolution that failed. However, now there are two international initiatives, which may or may not be competing initiatives. On the one hand, the United States, Argentina, Peru, Costa Rica, and other countries have already recognized Edmundo Gonzalez as the president-elect. On the other hand, Brazil, Mexico and Colombia are demanding that a breakdown of the vote tallies be presented and that they be independently verified. Meanwhile, Maduro's allies –Cuba, Nicaragua, China, Russia and Syria– support him. At the international level, which of these two options, in your opinion, contributes more to a possible negotiation?
Daniel Zovatto: First, Cuba, Nicaragua, Honduras and Bolivia are the only ones in the region that have recognized Maduro's victory. Honduras' position is very sad. Cuba's position is predictable. Regrettably, Nicaragua's position is also predictable –two dictatorships–, and Bolivia's position is really sad but predictable.
The rest of the region is divided into two parts: Twelve countries requested the OAS meeting. The fact that an OAS resolution was not adopted doesn't really keep me awake at night because in any case, it would not have a very strong effect.
Even so, nobody voted against the resolution. It didn't get the necessary votes because the bulk of the Caribbean countries always abstain, obviously because of the commitments they have with Maduro. The vote was only one short of 18, but neither Colombia nor Brazil could vote in favor because they are in this facilitation process, and Mexico made the decision –in my opinion ill-advised– to not even send its foreign minister to that meeting.
There is a group of countries that have already recognized Edmundo Gonzalez. Peru began, followed by the United States, now Argentina, but the one that really counts is that of the United States because of its weight. And the United States said two important things. They say that while all the evidence says that Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia won, they are not, in my opinion, willing to make a "Guaidó 2.0" move. In other words, they don't want to have two presidents in Venezuela again, [which is why] in the final part they say: "We urge the transition process to begin now."
The other three –Brazil, Colombia and Mexico, but above all Brazil and Colombia– issued a statement saying, basically, that the governments should present the results broken down by precinct and polling station in order to close this chapter. They have detailed the importance of these tally sheets being verified in an impartial manner, but they have not said how anything is going to be verified in an impartial manner if the two [national] electoral bodies are totally co-opted by the [Maduro] government.
Therefore, together with Juan Tokatlian, we have been recommending that the verification be carried out by Venezuelan authorities, with the accompaniment of all the [relevant] actors within Venezuela and an international technical electoral mission. They're still willing to facilitate a dialogue to reach an agreement.
Between the pressure from the United States, and at the same time the [offer of] facilitation by Brazil and Colombia –which are the two most important countries in South America to help find a way out–, we have to try to see if it's possible to persuade the Maduro regime to enter into a negotiation process. And I say "see if it's possible" because what we are seeing from the regime is that it is showing its teeth and barking. What I mean is that it's saying: "I am intransigent, I won, I am not going to negotiate, we have the strength. We don't care."
But there is a big "but". In Nicaragua there were fewer threats and much more repression. In Venezuela, the regime is making many threats, but it is not hitting hard. If it really wanted to move quickly and step up the repression, I'm not saying it wouldn't do so –there are already several dead and many arrested–, but for the moment I believe that there is still the possibility that, between pressure and negotiation, eventually one or several solutions can be found.
The limitations of the international community
On Thursday night, paramilitaries assaulted the headquarters of Vente Venezuela, and María Corina Machado has said that her personal safety is in danger, that she is in hiding. How can a bridge be established, a link, a negotiation process, when the government is only offering jail?
Daniel Zovatto: You know that all these negotiations are very messy. There is no element of purity with respect to a regime that says: I lost the election, let's sit down. The regime knows it has lost the election, it knows it has little legitimacy, it knows it has little popular support. Therefore, the less legitimacy they have, the more repression they have to impose, or at least threaten repression.
For example, when they started saying, "We are going to arrest María Corina," nobody who wants to arrest María Corina does it by saying "We are going to arrest María Corina." Rather, they go and arrest her, as they have already arrested some. So, the regime has not yet made the decision to cross this line, because they know that once they cross it, they detain Edmundo, they detain Maria Corina, and going back from there is going to be much more difficult.
I think we'll continue to see several scenarios where we will have to see to what extent the opposition and the government can enter into a dialogue to find a way out of this labyrinth. This is a solution to be negotiated among Venezuelans, within Venezuela, with the support of the international community.
The international community has all the limitations that we've already talked about with regards to Nicaragua. There won't be an invasion, nor do we see the [country's] Armed Forces willing to betray the regime, open up and carry out a coup d'état. We don't see massive demonstrations in the streets as we saw in Egypt, Tunisia or Belarus, which can generate social pressure that makes repression unsustainable or unfeasible on a practical level.
What remains to be seen is if there's room to lower the cost for the regime to leave while increasing the cost of staying. But this is a crisis that has only been going on for six days; it's still green, it's still very fluid. People would like to have a solution, but this is not an election in a democratic system where you go to the polls, and there is a result 24 or 48 hours later. It is the transition of an authoritarian regime looking for a negotiated electoral solution.
You said "The United States doesn't want to crown an elected president who is not recognized by the other side, as was the case of Juan Guaidó." What is the demand of the opposition to the international community?
Daniel Zovatto: The United States doesn't want to repeat "Guaidó 2.0." What are you going to do? Are you going to appoint Edmundo Gonzalez as president outside Venezuela? To do what? One thing is the aspiration and another thing is what you can really do with the relative strength you actually have.
What is left for the opposition to do is, first, continue on the electoral route to completely dispel the notion that the regime won the elections. Second, seek recognition that they [the opposition] are the ones who won, as they already have in some countries and especially in the United States. Third, continue defending those results in the streets, but in an intelligent way so as not to expose themselves to unbridled repression that could generate senseless slaughter. And fourth, [the opposition needs to] be ready, together with Brazil and Colombia, to see if a process of negotiation can be opened up, which has implications that many people may not like.
[Negotiations] will imply swallowing some bitter pills, but those are the only elements that could really allow you to open a space right now, because if you can't carry out an invasion, if you don't have the capacity to carry out demonstrations that collapse as the Caracazo did at the time, if you're not sure that the Armed Forces are going to divide and carry out a coup d'état against the regime, you have no other choice but to look for different negotiation mechanisms to look for solutions that are not going to be ones that people might like, but they are the only ones that allow you to move forward in this transition.
The "Nicaragua 2021 scenario"
We also have the experience of Nicaragua and other countries in which a regime simply decides to close up and take the leap forward, which is what Nicolas Maduro's strategy is aiming at right now. If the negotiation offers fail –these proposals by Brazil, Mexico and Colombia for the regime to present the vote tallies and open up–, can Maduro's dictatorship be imposed by force as Ortega did in Nicaragua three years ago, in 2021?
Daniel Zovatto: Right now, that's the most likely scenario, which we can't rule out. Maduro is thinking: Daniel Ortega could do it in a small country, basically without resources. He repressed much more severely, he killed 325 people and nothing happened to him. He put all the opposition in prison or made them flee the country. He expelled people like you. He took away your nationality... but Maduro is not there yet.
We always said that Ortega could do what Venezuela had done; that is, that Nicaragua could become Venezuela. Now what we are saying is that we fear that Venezuela could become Nicaragua. The possibility that if things don't go well, Maduro's regime will step on the gas and move forward in a scenario similar to that of Nicaragua, should not be discarded because that is, as of today, the most likely scenario. But it's not necessarily what will occur.
What I am seeing is that although they could do it and there's nothing at this moment to prevent them from doing it, they are not doing it. This means that if they're not doing it, it's because they have decided to not take that step yet, as Ortega did, because once you take that step, going back is much more difficult. They are going to have to look for a negotiated, peaceful, electoral, democratically untidy solution, but with a lot of pragmatism, where guarantees are given that many are not going to like.
It will be a tough pill to swallow, but I see no other way out because right now, the only thing the opposition has in its favor are the electoral results. It doesn't have an army, nor armed forces, nor does it have the streets full of people. It does have the support of an international community that has already said "invasion is not an option." Therefore, we know that it will be able to continue to exert some pressure, get some sanctions –which are not an end in themselves–, and not much more.
This article was published in Spanish in Confidencial and translated by our staff. To get the most relevant news from our English coverage delivered straight to your inbox, subscribe to The Dispatch.
