5 de septiembre 2023
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A journalistic investigation by CONFIDENCIAL revealed that twenty generals, among them Army General Julio Cesar Aviles who has been in office for 13 consecutive years, and two major generals who have been part of the general command for six years, are part of the “institutional cap” of the Nicaraguan Army, in which promotions in the military career depend on the political discretionality of dictator Daniel Ortega, as well as early retirements.
Political scientist Javier Melendez, founder of the Institute for Strategic Studies and Public Policy (IEEPP), cancelled by the regime in 2018, considers that this system responds “to Daniel Ortega's political interest in establishing a command based on political and party loyalty,” contrary to the institutional development that the Army experienced before Ortega's promotion.
“The Nicaraguan Army is the only military institution in Central America where the head of the Army is indiscriminately reelected,” exemplifies Meléndez, director of Expediente Abierto.
In an interview with CONFIDENCIAL and Esta Semana, Meléndez analyzed the consequences of this “institutional cap” for the promotion process in the military ranks. If Ortega's generals “cap” the possibility of promotions, “we don't know how much they are hurting and wounding the other officers,” because corruption in the army is too widespread, Melendez warned.
With the first reelection of General Julio Cesar Aviles in 2015, the process of the military handover in the Command of the Nicaraguan Army was broken. Does it have any consequence for the development of the military institution that Avilés has already remained in office for 13 consecutive years and will remain at the head of the Army at least until 2025?
What happened in 2015 was the culmination of something that Ortega had already demonstrated he wanted years earlier, to politically capture the Nicaraguan Army, under the criteria of a system that is completely opposed to the institutional development that the Army had achieved prior to Ortega's ascension.
Of course, the reelection of Aviles clearly marks the dictator's desire to send the message that what he needs is an Army with completely reliable commanders who are loyal to his project, which resulted in what we are seeing now since 2018.
Ortega's counter-reform
In 2014, the FSLN-controlled National Assembly approved a reform to the Military Code in which it eliminated the prohibition of the reelection of the military chief that had been established in 1994 during the Army's professionalization stage. Was that reform an institutional need of the Army? Did the Army need it or is it a political interest of Ortega?
In fact, the reforms needed by the Army, now Sandinista, began in 1990, in a somewhat self-managed process, but also with many political, strategic and security discussions about the new Army that Nicaragua needed. I met many specialists in Latin American civil-military affairs in the United States, and they recognized that the evolution of the institution from the 1990s until Ortega's entry was not only an example for the hemisphere, but a global example of an army evolving into a professional institution. And of course, the entry of Ortega and the legislation that was modified in 2014 are two vital points, with which Ortega reaffirms his project of institutional counter-reform of what the Army had been doing.
This same reform establishes in one of its articles that military service for officers will be 45 years and that they must be up to 65 years old as maximum age. And it says that for institutional interest, the time of service may be extended for general officers by the President of the Republic and for the rest of the officers by the Commander in Chief of the Army. Why does a military institution need this kind of system?
The Nicaraguan Army is the only military institution where the head of the Army is reelected indiscriminately. There is not a single country in Central America with this scenario, because the departure of high-ranking officers from an army allows oxygen and more professionalization, and more healthy competition to the officers.
Undoubtedly, the situation in Nicaragua and the security and defense environment must be analyzed from the perspective that they are institutions managed through the consistent violation of the laws. Avilés has already exceeded 65 years of age, he had no way to be reelected only because of Ortega's devious change of the laws. And undoubtedly, it is an intention that has less to do with institutional development and much more to do with political and partisan loyalty of subordination to the clientelistic interests of the Ortega Murillo family.
The other two members of the Army Command, Major Generals Bayardo Rodriguez, Chief of Staff, and Inspector Marvin Corrales, have been in their posts for six consecutive years. Does this have an effect on the institutional process?
Absolutely, the aspiration of an officer is to be promoted. If you enter a military institution, you enter a military academy with the right aspiration to exercise an important command within the institution.
Obviously, when you have the generals blocking the possibility of growing as an officer and aspiring to have the command of the institutions as a brigadier general, you generate a powerful institutional damage and you discourage internally a lot the senior officers. The issue is that the corruption of the Ortega Murillo regime has been like a cancer that has spread at all levels and in all institutions.
So, we do not know with certainty to what extent a scenario where the commanders "cap" the possibility of promotions is hurting and wounding the other officers. Because the Army is already so corrupt, it is impregnated with so many mafia interests and shared by the regime that a probable scenario is that the officers are not interested in this situation of no promotion and feel comfortable with the gifts and rewards that Daniel Ortega gives them for this loyalty.
In a normal army in Central America, Latin America, in the hemisphere, it would be a scenario of institutional crisis. It would be a scenario that would lead other officers to seek some kind of change of direction so that this stagnation, this blockage to the possibility of promotion, would not persist. But when it comes to the Nicaraguan Army, we do not know.
Security researcher Javier Melendez, director of Expediente Abierto. Photo/Confidencial
Corruption in the Army
But the new generation of officers who surely entered the Army, also encouraged by those institutional reforms that took place at the beginning of the 90's, who have been trained at the Higher Center for Military Studies, the lieutenant colonels, the colonels, how does this institutional cap affect their aspirations within the military career, can any uneasiness be perceived unofficially?
It would be necessary to better understand the level of corruption or the level of satisfaction that these officers have with the extras that they can obtain through the business of the army, or their placement in embassies, their placement as deputy directors, directors of institutions. There are several retired colonels who were retired without the possibility of moving up the professional ladder, but who were then placed as directors or deputy directors in state companies.
There is no army in Central America that has more active officers and recently retired officers participating in state institutions. And the other scenario, I believe, is that officers such as colonels or lieutenant colonels, faced with the impossibility of promotion, faced with the blockage represented by this scheme generated by Ortega with Avilés, were retired, and left the institution. And now they are making a living, receiving their pension from the Army Retirement Fund and surely trying to do another activity, and it is clear to them that outside the Army there is an important impossibility, even with the discontent, to raise their voices and ask for a change in the way things are being done.
The journalistic investigation published by CONFIDENCIAL on the Army and the military leadership reveals that in addition to Avilés there are 19 generals, two of them are major generals. The other 17 brigadier generals were promoted by Daniel Ortega; they have already been in that military rank for 13 years. At the end of the day, who decides which officers are re-elected and promoted and who are sent to retirement?
Surely there must be two parallel worlds, the world in which things are done formally documented and evidence is generated as to who gets the opportunity for promotion based on the criteria of being a good officer, of exercising their position well, of fulfilling their assigned functions, etc. But the other world is that of Aviles, the three brigadier generals and Daniel Ortega. Defining promotion or the possibility of remaining in the line of command based on party and political loyalty. That is unquestionable. Not a single member that does not have sufficient background of absolute loyalty to the regime is going to be filtered in.
When I saw the list of the 19 generals who are part of the Army's top brass, absolutely all of them have a background of the war in the 80's, they were guerrilla fighters, they were officers of the Sandinista Army in the 80's and that gives you an indicator that Ortega feels very comfortable having around him these types of people who in his world generate a kind of security, that he will have party subordination from them.
When I read your article, I was looking for some data. Notice that, for example, the U.S. Army has between officers, non-commissioned officers, civilian troops, around 1,260,000 troops, less numbers, more numbers, and it only has 900 generals. Venezuela has between 90,000 to 150,000. Do you know how many generals it has? 2,000 generals. So when you compare it in relative terms with the Nicaraguan Army, that is what Ortega has done. Maduro and Ortega have surrounded themselves with an oligarchy of officers very loyal to them, to the autocratic project, which guarantees institutional survival, guarantees strength to the regime and guarantees that there will be no major cracks in those armies. They remain loyal to Ortega for the same reason I told you, because it is an oligarchy of generals who are enjoying it and are having a great time.
This Monday will mark the 44th anniversary of the Army, which actually took place last Saturday. What can we expect from Ortega's or Aviles' message on this military anniversary?
The Army anniversary always brings to my mind the moment when, in 2010, General Halleslevens publicly accused me of being someone harmful to the institution through the IEEPP. And that was one of the decisions that led my family a couple of years later to leave the country. I think we are not going to expect anything different from what has happened so far.
Recently, General Aviles in a security exchange process promoted by Russia, virtually gave a declaration of war and of being an ideological enemy of the US Army and accused the West and its armies of being evil predators and that the Army (of Nicaragua), the Russian army, the armies of North Korea and China are on the right side of history.
So, with that precedent from two weeks ago, I believe that this Monday there will be a scenario in which Ortega will be hostile against the United States, and will reiterate that it is a Sandinista army subordinated to his interests, subordinated to the regime and a fundamental pillar of the regime.
This article was originally published in Spanish in Confidencial and translated by our staff.
